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Dean and Nadine Johnson borrowed money from First
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. to build a house.

They were

concerned that money from their construction loan might be
improperly disbursed.

They therefore told First Security that

they wanted to review all draw requests before disbursements
were made.

First Security denied this request.

It told the

Johnsons that it was an experienced construction lender with
special expertise in the area of draw requests.

It promised

the Johnsons that it would ensure that the loan proceeds were
properly disbursed.
The Johnsons believed First Security.

Unfortunately,

First Security betrayed the Johnsons' trust and breached its
promise by disbursing funds that the building contractor
converted to his own use.

These facts, which must be taken as

true for purposes of this proceeding, support claims for breach
of contract, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

This

Court should therefore reinstate the Johnsons claims against
First Security.
I.

The District Court erred by dismissing the
Johnsons' claims based on the contract between
the parties.

This case is before the Court on appeal of the
District Court's dismissal for failure to state a claim.

At

the motion to dismiss stage, the Court must take as true all of
the factual statements contained in the Johnsons' Complaint.
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The Complaint states a cause of action for breach of the
written contract between the Johnsons and First Security as
modified or for breach of a subsequent oral contract between
them.
First Security breached its written contract as
modified by disbursing funds without verifying that draw
requests it received from Polar Bear Homes were for labor and
materials used in the Johnsons' home.

The District Court

dismissed this claim on the ground that the written contract
unambiguously required the Johnsons to guarantee Polar Bear's
draw requests.

The District Court erred when it dismissed this

claim.
The written contract between the Johnsons and First
Security is ambiguous.

First Security correctly states that a

contract is ambiguous if "the words used to express the meaning
and intention of the parties are insufficient in a sense that
the contract may be understood to reach two or more plausible
meanings."

, cited at p. 6 of First Security's Brief.

In

addition, a contract is ambiguous when the writing leaves
uncertain or incomplete the parties' rights and duties.

Barnes

v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1988).
This agreement is ambiguous under both standards.
First Security relies on the final paragraph of the document
which reads:
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In consideration of the sum of $1.00 and for
the purpose of inducing the First Security
Bank of Utah, National Association, to
accept the foregoing Agreement the
undersigned hereby guarantee the performance
of said Agreement.
Even hindsight does not penetrate the armor of
unintelligibility that shields this paragraph from meaningful
interpretation.

The words lead the reasonable reader to

multiple plausible interpretations.

The paragraph may have

been intended to make Polar Bear responsible to First Security
if the Johnsons defaulted on their agreement to repay the
construction loan.

This form contract may have been generally

intended to be used for corporate transactions and the
guarantee was added to impose personal liability.

As used in

this transaction, the paragraph would simply require the
Johnsons to guarantee their own performance.
In addition, the guarantee renders ambiguous the
meaning of the term "undersigned" which, in the Building and
Loan Agreement, refers only to the Johnsons.

Because only the

Johnsons are "undersigned" within the meaning of the Building
and Loan Agreement, First Security is not insulated from
contract liability for disbursing funds in violation of the
terms of the agreement.

The interpretation urged by First

Security—that Polar Bear was a party to both the Building and
Loan Agreement and Guarantee—is the single most implausible of
all interpretations, and cannot be adopted at the motion to
dismiss stage.
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This "guarantee" paragraph also leaves uncertain the
Johnsons1 rights and duties.

It does not even suggest by

inference, much less state unambiguously, that the Johnsons
have the duty to verify Polar Bear's draw requests.
Security drafted this agreement.

First

If it had wanted the Johnsons

to free First Security of its own duties under the Agreement
and to guarantee the draw requests or the actions of Polar
Bear, it could have at least found words to clearly achieve
this objective.

Because the contract is ambiguous, the

District Court must take evidence to determine its intended
meaning.

Jarman v. Reagan Outdoor Advertising, 794 P.2d 492

(Utah App. 1990); Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v.
Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112, 1118 (Utah App. 1989).
The Johnsons' complaint alleges that First Security
agreed to review the draw requests and safeguard that the
proceeds were distributed properly.

This allegation is not the

product of a tortured reading of the contract or mere
statements uttered by Bank personnel, but rather emanates from
obligations expressly assumed by First Security.

Paragraph 5

of the Agreement imposes an express duty on the Bank to
disburse funds only for labor and materials used on the
project.

First Security's argument that it owed the Johnsons

no duty simply ignores the express language of paragraph 5 of
its Agreement.

The last sentence of paragraph 5 states:
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Such disbursements may be made to any of the
undersigned/ or, at the option of the Bank,
may be made to contractors, materialmen and
laborers, or any of them, for work or labor
furnished in connection with such
improvements."
Having exercised its option to pay contractors
directly and to bypass the Johnsons, the Bank cannot disregard
its duty to pay only for work provided for construction of the
Johnsons' house.

By paying the draw requests without review,

First Security breached this unambiguous duty.
Irrespective of considerations of contract ambiguity,
the District Court was obligated to consider testimony about
the existence and terms of the subsequent agreement by First
Security to verify the draw requests.

A written contract may

be modified by oral agreement between the parties.
Corp. v. Heard, 592 P.2d 12 (Colo.App. 1978).

Cordillera

Parol evidence

is proper to show subsequent oral agreements to modify a
written contract.

Silver Dollar Club v. Cosgriff Neon Company,

389 P.2d 923 (Nev. 1964) .
II.

The District Court erred by dismissing the
Johnsons' negligence claim.

The Johnsons' Complaint alleges that First Security
owed them a duty to use reasonable care in disbursing funds
from their construction loan.

First Security takes the

position that its common law duty is subsumed by its duty as
spelled out in the contract.

This position is contradictory
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since First Security also argues that it owes no duty under the
contract.
In addition, First Security's position is unsupported
by the law.

A bank is obligated to act reasonably in advising

its customers about their financial transactions.

In Nevada

Nat'l. Bank v. Gold Star Meat Company, 89 Nev. 427, 514 P.2d
651 (1973), the Nevada Supreme Court held:
where a bank office through its officer
undertakes to give advice, even
gratuitously, that officer is bound to use
the skill and expertise which he has or
which he could be presumed to have. When
that officer negligently or carelessly
attempts to discharge that duty by
misrepresenting facts within his knowledge,
the bank should be held responsible for
those misrepresentations.
514 P.2d at 654.

See also, Bank of Nevada v. Butler

Aviation-O'Hare, Inc., 616 P.2d 398 (Nev. 1980).
The law has progressed past the point where a party
will be heard to assert the existence of boilerplate
disclaimers to defend actions where the conduct of the parties
was contrary to the standardized provision asserted.

Courts

will no longer enforce even unambiguous provisions in
standardized contracts which are contrary to a party's separate
representation of intent which is reasonably relied upon.
This principle was acknowledged in Darner Motor Sales
v. Universal Underwriters, 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388, (1984),
wherein the Court expressly rejected the notion that provisions
of a standardized contract could be set up as a defense to a
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negligence claim.

In response to the assertion that failure to

read and understand a contract provision precluded an action
for negligence, the Court stated this this nation
prides itself on a tradition of allowing a
person to rely upon the words of another
who, because of special knowledge,
undertakes to act as an advisor. If an
agent has an economic self-interest in
imparting information, sound policy does
require that the agent's duty to speak
without negligence be reinforced in basic
tort principles inherent in the common law.
682 P.2d at 402.
Whether the Agreement required First Security to
supervise and verify the draw requests of Polar Bear or whether
it did not, when the Bank chose to do so and informed the
Johnsons that it was undertaking that responsibility, it was
obligated to exercise reasonable care in performing such
services.
Ill. The District Court erred in dismissing the
Johnsons' claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
First Security assumed a fiduciary duty to the
Johnsons when it undertook to perform special services based on
its special knowledge and expertise.

The Johnsons' Complaint

alleges that First Security told them it had special expertise
in the area of draw requests and that it would ensure the loan
proceeds were disbursed fairly.

In reliance on these

representations, and at the express instruction of First
Security, the Johnsons did not review the draw requests.
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A fiduciary or confidential relationship may be
created by circumstances where equity will imply a higher duty
in a relationship because the trusting party has been induced
to relax the care and vigilance he would ordinarily exercise.
Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743 (Utah
1982).

Whether such a relationship exists is necessarily a

fact issue that cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss.

Such

issues generally require factual development to determine
whether a plaintiff will be able to prove a set of facts
entitling them to relief for breach of fiduciary duty.

In Re

Nat. Mortg. Equity Corp. Mortg. Pool Cert., 682 F.Supp. 1073
(C.D.Cal. 1987).
The Johnsons* Complaint states a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty.

"[A] claim for breach of fiduciary duty is

sufficient if it alleges the fiduciary relationship and its
breach, as these two elements alone would establish
liability."

Young v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 790 F.2d 567 (7th

Cir. 1986) with reference to Restatement (Second) of Torts,
§ 874 and comment b.

See also Giroir v. MBank Dallas, N.A. 676

F.Supp. 915 (E.D.Ark. 1987) (the elements of a claim for breach
of a fiduciary duty are the existence of a fiduciary
relationship, a breach of the defendant's duty, and damages.)
The Johnsons' Complaint alleges that First Security was its
fiduciary, that First Security breached its fiduciary duty, and
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that the Johnsons were damaged.

Whether such issues can be

proven will require factual development.

CONCLUSION
First Security Bank seeks to hide behind a boilerplate
document.

It wants to interpret the document to mean that the

Johnsons are liable for any action of Polar Bear Homes and that
the Bank is free of any responsibility for its disbursement of
the Johnsons' loan proceeds.

Yet, even the Bank's own

boilerplate cannot shield it from its wrongdoing.

Both the

express language of the Agreement and the subsequent oral
agreements require First Security to scrutinize Polar Bear's
actions and be responsible for its failure to so do.

First

Security took upon itself this obligation and must now stand up
for its shortcomings.
Respectfully submitted this

7^

day of /gfeUA^/,

1991.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

Ronald E. Nehri

By.
Robert
I
Robei G. Wing Q \
u
Attc
torneys for
/
Plaintiffs/Appellants Dean Johnson
and Nadine Johnson
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